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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
-The United States Supreme Court has held that State statutes
which mandate that an employer not force an employee to work on
his chosen Sabbath are violative of the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment.
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).*
In 1975, Donald E. Thornton began working in a managerial po-
sition with Caldor, Incorporated, a chain of retail stores in the New
England area.' The particular store in which Thornton was em-
ployed was in the state of Connecticut.2 Initially, Caldor's Con-
necticut stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to state law.' The
Connecticut Legislature, however, revised the state's Sunday clos-
ing laws in 1979, after which Caldor opened its stores for Sunday
business.4 Due to the expanded store hours, Caldor required its
* Due to the unavailability of the Estate of Thornton opinion in the United States
Reports at the time of publication, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985). Thornton died on February 4,
1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The adminis-
trator of Thornton's estate has continued the suit on behalf of the estate. Id. at 2915 n.1.
Thornton was employed by Caldor as a manager of a men's and boys' clothing department.
Id. at 2915.
2. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 339, 464 A.2d 785, 788 (1983). Thornton
began working in Caldor's Waterbury, Connecticut store during 1975. Id.
3. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2915. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-300 - 53-303
(1958).
4. 105 S. Ct. at 2915 n.2. The state legislature revised the Sunday closing laws in 1976
after a state court had held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. See State
v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A.2d 244 (Conn. C.P. 1976). The legislature modified
the statute to allow certain types of businesses to remain open. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-302a
(Supp. 1962-1984).
The legislators simultaneously added a new provision, § 53-303e, which prohibited em-
ployment for more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right
not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. Id. Soon after the revised Sunday closing
law was enacted, a common pleas court declared it unconstitutional. See State v. Anony-
mous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A.2d 200 (Conn. C.P 1976). This decision was limited to the
section governing Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court refrained from assessing the validity
of other sections such as § 53-303e. Id.
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managers to work one out of every four Sundays on a rotational
basis.5
Thornton, a Presbyterian observing Sunday as his Sabbath, ini-
tially complied with Caldor's demands and worked thirty-one Sun-
days between 1977 and 1978.6 In October 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a managerial position at another Caldor store within
Connecticut where he continued to work his Sunday schedule
through November of 1979." It was around this time that Thornton
informed Caldor that he would no longer work on Sunday as that
was his Sabbath.8 Thornton claimed this option as a matter of
right protected by Connecticut statute.9
Subsequently, Thornton had several meetings with Caldor exec-
utives in an attempt to resolve the problem. As a result, Thornton
was offered two alternatives: first, to continue in a supervisory ca-
pacity at a Massachusetts store, which did not require Sunday em-
ployment; or second, to remain at his current location in a non-
In 1978, the Connecticut legislature tried once again to enact another Sunday closing law,
Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; The Supreme Court of Connecticut
declared the statute unconstitutional. See Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn.
304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979). As had the common pleas court, the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut did not assess the constitutionality of § 53-303e and that provision remained in effect
until challenged in this action before the United States Supreme Court. Id.
5. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916. The managerial employees were expected to
work every third or fourth Sunday on a rotation basis. Id.
6. Id. at 2916.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Specifically, Thornton invoked the protection of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e (Supp.
1962-1984) which provides in its entirety:
More than six days employment in calendar week prohibited. Employee observance
of Sabbath. Employee remedies.
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial occupation or
in the work of any industrial process to work more than six days in any calendar
week. An employee's refusal to work more than six days in any calendar week shall
not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(b) No person that states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath
may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to work
on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection (a) or
(b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation and
arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of said
subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole,
including but not limited to reinstatement in his former or comparable position.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether the applicant
observes any Sabbath.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than
two hundred dollars.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e (Supp. 1962-1984).
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supervisory capacity as a member of the employee union.10 Thorn-
ton found both alternatives equally unsavory and rejected both
offers.1"
In March 1980, Thornton was transferred to a clerical position
within the same store at a lower salary.12 He resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation and
Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his managerial
position in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 53-
303e(b).1 s Caldor defended its action before the Board on the
ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the mean-
ing of the statute.14 Caldor further urged the Board to find that
section 53-303e(b) violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitu-
tion"6 as well as the Establishment Clause of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution."6 The Board rejected both of
Caldor's proposed defenses and thereupon ordered Thornton rein-
stated to his managerial position with backpay and compensation
for lost benefits.1 7 On appeal, the superior court affirmed the
Board's decision, holding that section 53-303e(b) did not violate
the Establishment Clause.' 8
10. 105 S. Ct. at 2916. The collective bargaining agreement in effect for Caldor's non-
supervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it were
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." Id. at n.4.
11. Id. at 2916. The reasons for Thornton's refusal are more fully set forth in the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision. See Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788 (Thorn-
ton rejected both alternatives because of the distance and hardship involved in commuting
or moving to Massachusetts, and because remaining in Connecticut as a union member
would have involved a decrease in pay from $6.46 to $3.50 per hour).
12. 105 S. Ct. at 2916. See also Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339, 464 A.2d at 788 ("Caldor
informed him [Thornton], on Thursday, March 6, 1980, that there was 'no alternative other
than to revert you back to rank and file at $3.50 an hour beginning this Monday,'.
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2916. See supra note 9 for text of § 53-303e(b).
14. 105 S. Ct. at 2916.
15. Id. As a quasi-judicial body, the Board concluded that it lacked the authority to
pass on the constitutionality of state law and refused to consider Caldor's constitutional
challenge. Id. at 2917 n.5.
16. Id. at 2916. See also Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339-40, 464 A.2d at 789 & n.2. The
Establishment Clause of the first amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I, cl. 1. The Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
17. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916-17. Assuming the constitutionality of § 53-
303e(b) until a court declared otherwise, the Board decided that Thornton's dismissal by
Caldor had violated the statute's provisions. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. Bd. Med. &
Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 20, 1980). Thornton's remedy, fashioned by the Board, included
reinstatement to his former or comparable position with backpay and compensation for lost
fringe benefits. Id.
18. 105 S. Ct. at 2917. On November 18, 1980, Caldor filed an application to vacate the
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Caldor then appealed the superior court's decision to the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, pursuing the same defenses it had
presented before the superior court and the Board below. 9 Al-
though the court rejected Caldor's first contention that Thornton
was not discharged within the meaning of the statute,2 ° it agreed
with Caldor that section 53-303e(b) violated the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment. 21 In deciding whether section 53-
303e(b) passed constitutional muster under the Establishment
Clause, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the statute did
not have a "clear secular purpose, 22 the statute had a primary ef-
fect which impermissibly advanced religion, 23 and that the statute
arbitration award with the trial court pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418, alleging the
award to be illegal and beyond the power of the arbitrators in that (1) Thornton was not
"discharged" within the meaning of § 53-303e; and (2) § 53-303e was unconstitutional as a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339, 464
A.2d at 788-89.
In response, Thornton filed a cross-application, seeking confirmation of the arbitration
award pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-417. In a memorandum opinion, the trial court
concluded that § 53-303e did not violate the Establishment Clause and ruled that the Board
was correct in its determination that Thornton had been discharged within the meaning of
the statute. Accordingly, the court granted Thornton's cross-application for confirmation of
the arbitration award, while denying Caldor's petition to have the award vacated. Caldor,
191 Conn. at 340, 464 A.2d at 789.
19. 191 Conn. at 340, 464 A.2d at 789. See also supra text accompanying notes 14 &
16.
20. 191 Conn. at 340, 464 A.2d at 789. In considering the first contention, the court
was unwilling to accept Caldor's suggestion that because Thornton resigned from his job he
had not been "discharged." The court noted that the arbitration board found that Thornton
had been discharged within the meaning of the statute, therefore, it was a settled fact which
they could not review. Id.
21. Id. at 343, 464 A.2d at 792. Justice Grillo, writing for the majority, set forth the
test which the statute must pass in order not to impinge upon the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment. Justice Grillo noted that "[it is settled law that in order to pass mus-
ter under the establishment clause, the statute 'in question, first, must reflect a clearly secu-
lar legislative purpose, second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and third, must avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion.'" Id.
The court also noted that if the statute falls to pass any one part of the test, it must fall. Id.
22. Id. at 343, 464 A.2d at 793. Noting that the Supreme Court held in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445-52 (1961), that a statute may have a valid secular purpose of
providing a common day of rest for both religious and non-religious citizens, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court declared that § 53-303e(b) stretched this rationale too far since it au-
thorized each employee to designate his or her own observance of Sabbath. 191 Conn. at
343, 464 A.2d at 793. The unmistakable purpose of such a provision, the court reasoned, was
to allow those persons who worship on a particular day the freedom to do so, and this did
not pass constitutional muster under the "clear secular purpose" test. Id.
23. Id. at 344, 464 A.2d at 794. The court reasoned that the "benefit" of choosing to
take a particular day of the week off was conferred on a strictly religious basis because
under the statute only those employees who designate a Sabbath are entitled, with impu-
nity, to not work on a particular day, while those who do not observe a Sabbath may not
avail themselves of the same unbridled benefit. According to the court, the primary effect of
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promoted excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gion. For all of these reasons, the court concluded that section
53-303e(b) violated the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment.
Thornton subsequently filed and was granted a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States.25 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, noted that in Establishment Clause cases,
the Court must strike down any government activity which either
impinges on religious freedom or potentially creates a state reli-
gion .2 The Chief Justice then relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman2 7 as
stating the correct test to be used in Establishment Clause cases.28
Lemon dictates that in order for a statute to pass constitutional
muster, it must not only have a clear secular purpose and not fos-
ter excessive entanglement of government and religion, but also, its
primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion.29 Focusing on
section 53-303e(b), the Court observed that:
The Connecticut statute ... guarantees every employee, who "states that a
particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath," the right not to
work on his chosen day .... The State has thus decreed that those who
observe a Sabbath any day of the week as a matter of religious conviction
must be relieved of the duty to work on that day, no matter what burden or
inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers.30
Thus, the Court concluded that section 53-303e(b) granted an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day the
religious employee happened to unilaterally designate.31 This right,
this incongruent grant of benefit was to advance religion. Id.
24. Id. It was the third criterion as set forth by the court (See supra note 21 and
accompanying text) which presented the "most troublesome consideration." Id. According
to the court, in looking at the effect of § 53-303e(b) it is necessary to also consider § 53-
303e(c), which provides the arbitration board with the right to resolve disputes arising
under subsection (b). Id. See supra note 9 for the exact text of the statute.
25. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984). The Supreme Court also
granted the motion of the State of Connecticut to intervene as of right to defend the consti-
tutionality of § 53-303e(b). Id.
26. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2917 (1985). In Estate of
Thornton, five justices joined Chief Justice Burger in the majority, Justice O'Connor filed a
concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, and Justice Rehnquist dissented with-
out a written opinion. Id.
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28. 105 S. Ct. at 2917.
29. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
30. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917.
31. Id. The Court noted that the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration came to
the same conclusion with regard to the statute, that the statute provided Thornton with the
absolute right not to work on the Sabbath. Id. at 2917 n.8. See also Caldor, Inc. v. Thorn-
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the Court noted, correspondingly placed an absolute duty on em-
ployers and employees to conform their business practices to the
particular religious practices of the religious employee.32 According
to the Court, the inevitable result of section 53-303e(b) is that reli-
gious concerns of Sabbath observers are raised above all secular
interests in the workplace and given a weight unyielding to the ex-
pense of all other interests.33 Therefore, the Court concluded, sec-
tion 53-303e(b) went far beyond the point of only having an inci-
dental and remote effect of advancing religion, and thus failed the
primary effect test of Lemon.34 Accordingly, the Court held that
the Connecticut statute violated the Establishment Clause of the
first amendment.
3 5
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed with the ma-
jority that the appropriate test to be used in Establishment Clause
cases was that enunciated by the Court in Lemon, and also agreed
with the majority's analysis under the Lemon test. 6 Justice
O'Connor, however, pointed out that while section 53-303e(b) must
fall under the Court's analysis, she did not interpret the Court's
opinion as suggesting that the religious accommodation provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were similarly unconsti-
tutional.37 The crucial differences between Title VII and the Con-
ton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 20, 1980).
The Supreme Court also noted that this was the construction given and accepted by the
State Superior Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court in the proceedings of the case
below. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917 n.8. See, e.g., Caldor, 191 Conn. at 340-43,
350, 464 A.2d 785, 789-90, 794 (1983). The federal courts are bound to apply the construc-
tion of state law as construed by the state courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167
(1975); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 169 (1961).
32. 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
33. Id. The Court noted, for example, that under the statute, there is no allowance
made for the special circumstances as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an occupa-
tion with a Monday through Friday work schedule, such as a school teacher; nor does the
statute provide for special consideration if a high percentage of the employer's work force
asserts rights to the same Sabbath. Id. Moreover, the Court noted, there is no exception
allowed when honoring the choice of the Sabbath observer would impose substantial eco-
nomic burdens on the employer or when such compliance would require the employer to




36. Id. at 2918-19 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
37. Id. at 2919. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982)
defines the affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate by providing the following:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer is able to demonstrate that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Vol. 24:923
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necticut statute were, according to Justice O'Connor, twofold: one,
while section 53-303e(b) calls for absolute accommodation for the
religious employee in the workplace, Title VII only requires rea-
sonable accommodation; and, two, section 53-303e(b), ostensibly
an equal employment opportunity statute, confers its benefit solely
upon Sabbath observers, while Title VII extends its protection to
all religious groups, as well as to all groupings by race, national
origin and sex."8
The Establishment Clause of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion. ' ' s Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held this prohibition not only to proscribe the establishment of
a national religion but also to forbid governmental assistance in
sectarian programs.4 0 The Establishment Clause has been tradi-
tionally viewed as mandating government neutrality in religious
matters4' and guaranteeing the separation of church and state.42
Id.
Prior to 1972, Title VII simply prohibited employers from using religion, or other enumer-
ated criteria, as a factor in employment decisions. Section 2000e-2 of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
38. 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor obviously felt the
need to defend Title VII against the constitutional scrutiny to which § 53-303e(b) was sub-
jected. Her defense of Title VII is, however, inarticulate and superficial. See infra note 130
and accompanying text.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15-16 (1947).
41. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 226, 306 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); Everson, 330
U.S. at 18.
42. Comment, Meuller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establish-
ment Clause?, 68 IOWA L. R.v. 539, 542 (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14-4, at 818-19 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as TRIBE). Tribe suggests that two fundamen-
tal principles underlie the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses: voluntarism and sepa-
ratism or "neutrality." Designed to prevent any direct or indirect compulsion in matters of
belief, the Free Exercise Clause is a mandate of religious voluntarism. The Establishment
Clause involves the principle of voluntarism in terms of ensuring that the church sustains
itself only through voluntary support of its followers, not from political support of the state.
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The juridical controversy over the Establishment Clause has
centered around the degree of government neutrality and separa-
tion that the mandate requires. Although the Supreme Court has
frequently noted Thomas Jefferson's concept of a high and impreg-
nable "wall of separation between church and state, '43 the Court
has been loath to apply such a theory of strict government neutral-
ity toward religion." Having rejected an absolute construction and
mechanical application of the Establishment Clause, the Court has
been in a continuing debate over the appropriate degree of govern-
ment neutrality required.4
The scope of the Establishment Clause mandate evolved into its
present form in the 1970's, primarily through a case by case analy-
sis.4" The majority of these cases involved public aid to parochial
The separation principle requires that the state refrain from involvement in religious affairs
and prohibits fragmentation of the electorate by reason of sectarian differences. Id. at 818-
19.
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), re-
printed in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861). The "high
and impregnable" characterization was given by the Supreme Court in Everson, 330 U.S. at
18. See also TRIBE, supra note 42, at 817 n.58, where the author notes that Thomas Jeffer-
son supported the separation primarily as a means to protect the state from the church.
Jefferson believed that only the strictest "wall of separation between church and state,"
would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions from politics and preserve free
choice among political views. Id.
44. See Larken v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982); Laycock, Towards
a General Theory of Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1416 (1981). The solidity of the wall as an
absolute barrier to government involvement with religion has never been certain. In Ever-
son, Justice Black wrote for the Supreme Court majority: "The First Amendment has er-
ected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach." 330 U.S. at 18. But having set the strict standard,
the Everson Court turned around and upheld a state program to pay expenses for students
of parochial as well as public schools. Noting the apparent irony of the majority decision,
Justice Jackson dissented: "[T]he undertones of the opinion .. .seem utterly discordant
with its conclusion. . . . [T]he most fitting precedent is that of Julia, according to Byron's
Reports, 'whispering, "I will ne'er consent," consented.'" Id. at 19 (Jackson, J.,dissenting).
45. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-70 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington, 374 U.S. at 222; Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
46. For a discussion of the criticisms of a case-by-case approach, see Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229, 265-66 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Buchanan, Accom-
modation of Religion in Public Schools: A Plea for Careful Balancing of Competing Consti-
tutional Values, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1000, 1021 (1980); Marty, Of Darters and Schools and
Clergymen: The Religion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 171, 182. See also
McDonald, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory Religious Accommodation in
the Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L. REV. 121, 121-22 (1984) (for a survey of the incongruent and
confusing decisions rendered under a case-by-case approach).
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schools47 or religious practices in public schools.' For example, in
Everson v. Board of Education,'4  the first major decision in this
area, the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause to state
legislation. In Everson, the Court adopted the first prong of mod-
ern Establishment Clause analysis-the secular purpose test. 0
In Everson, a New Jersey statute authorizing local school dis-
tricts to provide transportation to nonpublic as well as public
school pupils was challenged.51 In the majority opinion, Justice
Black noted initially that only a strict policy of no-aid to parochial
schools could preserve the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause. 2 However, realizing the undesirable consequences of such
an absolute policy, Justice Black reasoned that incidental benefits
to religious institutions were permissible so long as these benefits
were derived from legislation that had a valid secular purpose.53
47. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salaries, textbooks and other materi-
als); Tilton, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (construction grants to colleges); Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(textbook loans); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation).
48. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer reading in public schools); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release time from public schools for religious training).
49. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Establishment Clause of the first amendment
was held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Free Exercise
Clause was similarly applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
50. 330 U.S. at 5-8.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 16. Justice Black was referring to Thomas Jefferson's concept of a "wall of
separation between church and state." Justice Black stated in Everson,
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can they
pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another
.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice a religion ....
Id. at 15-16.
Despite this pronouncement, the Court has been loath to follow such a strict policy. See,
e.g., Comment, Statute Granting Tax Deductions for Tuition Paid by Parents of Sectarian
and Non-Sectarian School Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause: Meuller
v. Allen, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 272-73 (1983).
53. 330 U.S. at 16-18. Justice Black noted that while under the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment, New Jersey could not use tax raised funds to support any religious
institution, the language of the first amendment also commanded that New Jersey could not
hamper its citizens in the exercise of their own religions. Id. As Justice Black concluded:
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans ....
Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. While we
do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to chil-
dren attending public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New
Jersey against state established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertantly
prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens
without regard to religious belief.
Id. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358-59 (1984) (Court's reiteration that the
notion that tensions exist between the goal of preventing governmental intrusion into reli-
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Applying this test, the Everson Court held that legislation ensur-
ing the safe delivery of children to and from school had a public
welfare rather than religious goal, and consequently was
permissible. 4
The "valid secular purpose" test, in the years which followed the
Everson decision, proved to be an inadequate means of gauging
permissible government activity in religious contexts. As the Court
struggled with first amendment challenges to Sunday-closing
laws, 55 released-time arrangements on and off public school prem-
ises, 6 and prayer in public schools,57 it soon became apparent to
the Court that the states were attempting to circumvent constitu-
tional challenges by masquerading clearly religious legislation in
statements of legitimate secular purposes.5 s To deal with this sub-
terfuge, the Court reformulated the test to include two
prongs-the "valid secular purpose" inquiry of Everson, and the
"primary effect" inquiry. s9
gious areas and the reality that total separation is impossible).
54. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
55. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing
laws because of the legitimate secular purpose of giving everyone a day of rest).
56. A released-time arrangement allows public school students to have time away from
their secular studies for religious instruction when they do not have access to sectarian
schools. See Comment, supra note 52, at 274 n.38. See also Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that a released-time program with religious
instruction on public school property was invalid as violating the Establishment Clause);
and Zorach, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (relying on the Free Exercise Clause to approve the release
of students for religious instruction off public school premises).
57. See Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting the use of state-written prayer in the
public schools).
58. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 223. In Abington, the rule called into question under the
Establishment Clause provided for the opening exercises of the public schools to include
readings from the Bible and or the Lord's Prayer. Id. Trying to ground the legislation in a
secular purpose, the state contended that the program was an effort to extend its benefits to
all public school children without regard to their religious belief, and, among its secular
purposes, the legislation was designed to promote moral values, contradict the materialistic
trend of the time, perpetuate American institutions, and teach literature. Id.
In response, the Court observed:
But even if [the legislative] purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accom-
plished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. Surely the place of the
Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of
the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific
permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent
amendment permitting non-attendance at the exercises. None of these factors is con-
sistent with the contention that the Bible here is used as an instrument for nonreli-
gious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.
Id. at 224.
59. Abington, 374 U.S. at 222. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15 (valid secular purpose
test).
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The "primary effect" prong of the test demands that the princi-
pal consequence of the legislation neither positively nor negatively
bear upon religion.60 Under this inquiry, although a state may have
a purported secular purpose in its legislation or program, the
courts may nevertheless invalidate the law or state program if it
has the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion."
This prong of Establishment Clause analysis was first unveiled and
applied in Abington School District v. Schempp,12 where the Court
invalidated statutes requiring Bible readings and prayer in public
schools. The next application of the two prong "purpose-effect"
test came five years later in Board of Education v. Allen" where
the Court upheld a New York textbook loan program which pro-
vided for the loan of textbooks to both private and public school
pupils alike.
Finally, in 1970, the Court developed the third and final prong of
the Establishment Clause analysis in Walz v. Tax Commission,"
where the Court denied a challenge to the tax exempt status con-
ferred to church property by the New York Constitution. In the
final step of its analysis, the Walz Court considered the degree of
entanglement between church and state created by the tax exemp-
tion, stating that the Establishment Clause forbids excessive and
continuing administrative entanglement between government and
60. Abington, 374 U.S. at 222.
61. Application by the Court of the primary effect test involves two criteria to deter-
mine whether a statute will pass constitutional muster. See generally Comment, Tax De-
duction for Parents and Children Attending Public and Non-Public Schools: Mueller v.
Allen, 71 Ky. L.J. 685, 687-90 (1982-83) (discussing application of the primary effect test).
The first criterion requires that the activity being aided have clearly distinguishable secular
aspects from its religious aspects so that a court can be certain that only the secular activi-
ties are aided. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
480 (1973). The second criterion looks to the breadth of the benefitted class: if the class is
too narrow, the statute is suspect. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794.
62. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For a general discussion of the Abington decision, see supra
note 58 and accompanying text.
63. 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968). The Allen Court, however, concentrated on the pri-
mary effect prong of the test, reasoning that since the financial benefit of the state aid
flowed to the parents and their children and not directly to religious schools, the statute did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id.
64. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). First, the Court noted that the tax exempt status of the
church had a long standing history. Id. at 666-67. Second, the Court examined the breadth
of the benefited class, emphasizing that religious institutions represented merely one of sev-
eral non-profit, quasi-public corporations and institutions granted tax exempt status under
the New York Constitution. Id. Furthermore, according to the Walz Court, the federal gov-
ernment and every state had granted churches a property tax exemption, modeled after a
Virginia statutory scheme adopted in 1800. Id.
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religious institutions.6 8 The Court then observed that the state in-
volvement caused by the exemption was "minimal and remote"
and far less than that contact that would result if religious institu-
tions were subject to taxation.6 Accordingly, the Walz Court up-
held the tax exemption for religious institutions in New York.
6 7
Concern with this last element, excessive entanglement between
church and state, represented the third and final prong in subse-
quent Establishment Clause analysis.
These three prongs finally merged into one cohesive test for-
mally adopted by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.es
There, the Court invalidated state subsidy of parochial school
teacher salaries.6 Noting that the state law passed the secular pur-
pose and primary effect tests, the Court nevertheless invalidated
the program because it did not pass the excessive entanglement
portion of the test.70 The Court stated that the state subsidy of
parochial school teacher salaries not only promised to entangle
church and state in complicated administrative procedures, but
also promised to generate "heated" church related debates in the
legislature during annual appropriation sessions.7'
Additionally, the Court's opinion in Lemon indicated that the
entanglement prong of the test is itself a two-tiered inquiry. First,
the Court inquires into whether a statute impermissibly fosters ex-
cessive administrative entanglement between government and reli-
gion7 2 and, secondly, the Court asks whether the challenged statute
65. Id. at 676.
66. Id. at 674. The Court reasoned that taxation would ultimately result in greater
entanglement in the form of "tax valuations of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and the direct confrontation and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes."
Id.
67. Id. at 675.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Therein, the Court stated:
[elvery analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests must be gleaned from our
cases. First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive, governmental entanglement with religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court more clearly articulated the entan-
glement prong of the test. Id. at 614-25.
69. Id. at 620.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 615. The Lemon Court, outlining the basic line of inquiry in the area of
administrative entanglement, said: "[The Court] must examine the character and purposes
of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id. The Lemon
Court invalidated a state program because it created excessive administrative entanglement,
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has the potential for dividing an electorate or legislature along reli-
gious lines.
73
A statute which fails either the secular purpose test, the primary
effect test, or the administrative entanglement test will be held un-
constitutional.74 Although the Court considers political division as
dangerous because it will divert legislative attention away from
other important issues, it has never invalidated a statute solely be-
cause it failed the political entanglement test.75 Instead, a statute's
propensity for political divisiveness triggers a warning signal, pro-
voking the Court to review the analysis under the other areas with
stricter scrutiny.7
reasoning that the program would require "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance" to operate. Id. at 619. Cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Ohio
state program which sought to provide non-public schools with textbooks and auxiliary ser-
vices created excessive administrative entanglement since participation in the program was
contingent upon compliance with state restrictions and the state would have to continuously
monitor compliance). See also Meek v. Pettinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the test for administrative entanglement cannot
be relentlessly applied, reasoning that some administrative entanglement is inevitable when
otherwise valid laws or government activities affect religion. See Larken, 459 U.S. at 123;
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614; Tilton, 403 U.S. 672 (upholding lump sum federal construction
grants to non-public colleges); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). See also J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (2d ed. 1983) (here-
inafter cited as NOWAK).
73. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24; accord, Wolman, 433 U.S. 229, 258 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); see also TRIBE, supra note 42, § 14-12, at 866;
Goffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in
Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 206 & n.7 (1980); Schotten,
The Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental Entanglement: The Constitu-
tional Status of Aid to Non-Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 207, 222 (1979).
74. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
271 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (quoting
Lemon); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. See also R. MILLER
& R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALrrY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT
302 (rev. ed. 1982); Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Eval-
uation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 145 (Spring 1981).
75. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 258; Meek, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795-96
(1973) (competing efforts by various religious groups to gain support of government strains
political system "to the breaking point") (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,
694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also TRIBE, supra note 42, § 14-12 at 867 (The
Court has stressed danger of political division along religious lines).
76. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98 ("While the prospect of [political] divisiveness may
not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws . . . it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to
be ignored") (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)); accord, Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1358-59; Meek, 421 U.S. at 365 n.15; NOWAK, supra note 72, at 1035; Ripple, The
Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV.
1195, 1203 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 42, § 14-12, at 866.
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Since Lemon, the three-prong test has been used by the Su-
preme Court as the guiding standard for resolving Establishment
Clause cases. 77 Although two recent cases, Marsh v. Chambers
78
and Larson v. Valente, 9 seem, superficially, to indicate a change of
direction by the Court in this area, a closer examination of these
cases proves otherwise.
In Marsh, the Court focused on historical evidence to uphold the
constitutionality of a state legislature's practice of opening their
sessions with a prayer.80 The Court concluded that this practice
had become meshed in the fabric of society and its unique history
posed no threat to the Establishment Clause.81 Marsh, however, is
clearly distinguishable from those cases in which the Court has
uniformly applied the Lemon test. The most salient difference is
that the challenged activity involved government action and did
not compel the action of private individuals. Moreover, unlike the
majority of state actions challenged under the Establishment
Clause,8 2 legislative prayer existed at the time that the Establish-
ment Clause was drafted and, therefore, its retention raised the
presumption that the Framers did not consider the practice incon-
sistent with the purpose of the Establishment Clause. 3
In Larson, the Court used a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate
a state statute that overtly favored specific religious denominations
over others through registration and disclosure requirements for
contributions to religious organizations.8 4 The Court held that stat-
utes which intentionally discriminate among religions are invalid
77. See, e.g., Larken, 459 U.S. 116; Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756; Tilton, 403 U.S. 672; and
Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41.
78. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
79. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 3330-36.
81. Id. at 3335-36 (the statute was merely a tolerable acknowledgement of widely held
beliefs).
82. Traditionally the Establishment Clause cases have centered around state legisla-
tion and programs designed to aid sectarian schools. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602
(teacher salaries, books, and other materials); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672 (construction grants to
colleges); Allen, 392 U.S. at 236 (textbook loans); Everson, 330 U.S. at 1 (bus transporta-
tion); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (prayer reading in public schools); Zorach, 343 U.S. 306 (release
time from public schools for religious training).
83. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3333-34.
84. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-51. The state statute provided that only those religious
organizations which solicited more than 50% of their total contributions from non-members
were subject to the registration and reporting requirements of the charitable solicitations
statute, while religious organizations which received less than half of their contributions
from non-members were exempt from the requirements. Id. at 231-32.
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unless justified by a compelling state interest.8 5 The Larson
Court's application of a compelling state interest test, however,
does not represent an abandonment of the Lemon test. Rather, the
statute in Larson was discriminatory on its face, since the target of
the discrimination under the statute was religion, a fundamental
right, and the Court has long held that when a state activity, regu-
lation or program implicates a fundamental right, the state activity
is subject to a strict scrutiny (compelling state interest) standard
of review. 6 Furthermore, while the strict scrutiny standard was ap-
plied in Larson, the Court indicated that the Lemon test, if ap-
plied, would have rendered substantially the same result.87 Thus,
the Court apparently set forth two propositions in Larson: one,
strict scrutiny will be required if a statute contains explicit denom-
inational preferences among religions,88 but two, the Lemon test is
the appropriate analysis for statutes, although facially neutral, that
either confer their benefits on some religions or confer their bene-
fits on religion generally.89
Whatever doubts were raised by Marsh and Larson as to the via-
bility of the Lemon test were alleviated by the Court in Lynch v.
Donnelly." In Lynch, the Court held that a city's display of a na-
tivity scene during the Christmas season did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.9 1 Although the Lynch majority expressed its un-
willingness to confine itself to a single method of analysis, the meat
of the Court's decision was based on the inquiry laid down in
Lemon.2
Although Establishment Clause cases have traditionally centered
around state aid to and state programs for sectarian schools, im-
portant and controversial Establishment Clause cases have most
recently arisen in the employment arena.93 A number of federal
85. Id. at 246.
86. Id. See, e.g, Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("Where there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling"); accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)
("Where certain 'fundamental rightr' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limit-
ing these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.' ").
87. 456 U.S. at 251-55.
88. Id. at 246.
89. Id. at 251-55.
90. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
91. Id. at 1366.
92. Id. at 1362-65. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor went to great lengths to
demonstrate that the analysis of the Marsh and Larson decisions could be assimilated into
the traditional Lemon test. Id. at 1366-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
1986
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 24:923
and state laws now require employers to accommodate the reli-
gious observances and practices of their employees. 4 For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 was amended by the
1972 Congress to include an affirmative duty of the employer to
accommodate his employees on religious grounds."6 Many states
have followed suit by adopting statutes or regulations that prohibit
religious discrimination in the workplace and require the employer
to modify facially neutral work practices when these practices con-
flict with an employee's religious beliefs or observances.97 Several
of these "accommodation" statutes have been challenged in state
courts on constitutional grounds,9 however, these courts have vir-
tually all skirted the constitutional issue and focused their inquiry
on statutory interpretation.9
The principal case represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has determined whether such religious accommodation stat-
utes violate the Establishment Clause of the first amendment.100
94. These "accommodation" statutes allow the employees to invoke "reasonable ac-
commodation" rules to avoid working on their observed Sabbath, and thereby alter their
normal work schedule. See supra note 37; see also infra note 99 and accompanying text.
95. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982)) (hereinafter
referred to as Title VII).
96. See supra note 37 for the complete text of Title VII § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2,
which codified the affirmative duty to accommodate.
97. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
53-303e (1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 344.030(5),
'344.040(1), 436.165(4)(a) and (b) (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492 (Cum. Supp. 1983);
id. at art. 49B, 14-16 (1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.1A (West 1976); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 578.115 (Vernon 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(4) (1955); N.Y. EXEc. LAW §
296.10 (McKinney 1982) (explicitly accommodating Sabbath observers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43 § 955.1 (Purdon 1964) (explicitly accommodating Sabbath observers who are public em-
ployees); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-30(k), 1-13-80 (Law Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-28.2,
40.1-28.3 (1981) (explicitly accommodating Sabbath observers); W. VA. CODE § 61-10-27
(1977). In other states, accommodation is required by regulation. See, e.g, [State Laws] Fair
Empl. Prac. (BNA) 453:1141 (Colo. Sept. 25, 1980); 45:1708 (D.C. June 11, 1976); Id. at 1
45:2756 (Ill. Dec. 12, 1973).
98. See, e.g., Anderson v. General Dynamics, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1983); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981).
99. See, e.g., Gavin v. Peoples Natural 'Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Yott v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928
(1980). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), construing the reli-
gious accommodation provisions of Title VII and its scope, the Supreme Court ruled that
requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimus cost would constitute an "undue
hardship" on the employer. Id. at 84. The Hardison Court, however, left open the issue of
whether a statute can, consistently with the first amendment, require employers to grant
privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation process. Id. at 70.
100. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that
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At the outset of its analysis, the Court announced that the Lemon
test would be applied in Estate of Thornton to determine the con-
stitutionality of the Connecticut religious accommodation statute,
which provides, in part:
No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An em-
ployee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal.'01
After briefly reiterating the three areas of inquiry under Lemon,
the Court confined its analysis of section 53-303e(b) to the primary
effect prong of the test.102 Without elaborating on the require-
ments under the primary effect analysis for a statute to pass con-
stitutional muster, the Court delved into the statutory text and
hastily struck the statute down.103 Concentrating on the express
language of the statute, the Court observed that section 53-303e(b)
effectively conferred upon the Sabbath observer an absolute and
unqualified right not to work on whatever day he might happen to
designate as his Sabbath.10 4 Moreover, the Court noted, the statute
mandated a corresponding absolute duty on both employers and
employees to conform their business practices to the particular
practices of the employee by enforcing, under penalty, the obser-
vance of the Sabbath unilaterally designated by the employee.105
Although not expressly stated, the absolute nature of the rights
and duties under the statute is what the Court seemingly found
most repugnant. According to the Court, the benefits of the statute
were inequitably distributed to the Sabbath observer with little or
no regard for the competing interests of the employer and non-
religious, fellow employees.106 For example, the Court pointed out
provisions of Title VII which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discharge any individual because of his religion does not violate the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment), affd per curiam mem. by evenly divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976),
vacated on non-constitutional grounds, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); aff'd per curiam by an evenly divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971). Note, a judgment which is entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to
precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
101. 105 S. Ct. at 2917. See supra note 9 for complete text of the statute.
102. 105 S. Ct. at 2917.
103. Id. at 2917-18.
104. Id. at 2918. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
106. Id. at 2918. The Court declared that the absolute favoring of the Sabbath ob-
server under the statute contravened a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses: "[tihe
First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests
others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." Id. at 2918 (quoting
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that the statute failed to give any special consideration to the em-
ployer if a high percentage of his work force asserted the same
Sabbath.10 7 Similarly, the Court noted that the statute provided no
exception to the mandatory accommodation requirement when
honoring the dictates of the Sabbath observer would cause the em-
ployer substantial economic burdens, or place significant burdens
on fellow employees required to work in his place. 10 8 Hinting that
reasonable rather than absolute accommodation might be more de-
sirable and constitutionally acceptable, the Court criticized the
statute as failing to account for the competing interests of the em-
ployer and fellow employees. 10 9
The Court concluded that the Connecticut statute was blatantly
askewed in the Sabbath observer's favor and thus went far beyond
merely having an incidental and remote effect upon religion. 110 In-
stead, the Court concluded, it had a primary effect of impermissi-
bly promoting a particular religious practice."'
Even though the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate section
53-303e(b) as violative of the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment was correct, the Court's analysis in reaching that deci-
sion was woefully inadequate. Religious accommodation statutes
regulating employment practices are a fairly recent develop-
ment. 112 However, the majority of states, either through statute or
administrative regulation, have now developed such accommoda-
tion programs." 3 Estate of Thornton represents the first time that
the Court has decided the constitutionality of a religious accommo-
dation statute regulating employment practices. 1 4 Both the nov-
elty of the constitutional issue and the widespread use of the stat-
utes should have signaled the Court that a more careful analysis
was needed. Properly handled, the Court's decision in Estate of
Thornton could have provided legislatures with distinct guidelines
in drafting their religious accommodation statutes, and could have
also clarified the Court's position with respect to those guidelines.
Unfortunately, we do not receive such guidance from Estate of
Judge Learned Hand in Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
107. 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
108. Id. at 2918 & n.9.
109. Id. at 2918.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. With a few exceptions, the bulk of the
state religious accommodation statutes have been enacted since the 1970's.
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.




The Court properly chose to apply the Lemon test to section 53-
303e(b) but then proceeded in a summary fashion to strike the
statute down under the primary effect prong of the test." 5 In so
doing, the Court failed to address several factors that have been
considered pertinent to the evaluation of primary effect by past
Supreme Court decisions: first, a determination must be made as
to whether the statute advances the interests of religious persons
and, in so doing, favors them over the interests of non-religious
persons;" 6 second, it must be determined whether the law favors
the interests of certain sects over other sects;" 7 and third, it must
be ascertained whether the government has singled out, on the ba-
sis of religion, a narrow class of citizens as beneficiaries of compul-
sory treatment." 8 In the principal case, the Court only deals with
the first factor listed above, while failing to even mention the re-
maining two." 9 Does this mean that only one of the three inquiries
need be answered in the affirmative for the statute to fail the pri-
mary effect test? The Court does not say, but this may be reasona-
bly inferred.
The Court appropriately discusses how section 53-303e(b) favors
and advances the interests of Sabbath observers at the expense of
the employers and non-religious fellow employees. Nevertheless,
the Court's analysis stops short of resolving several crucial points.
For example, the Court fails to note that in the area of religious
accommodation, it has recognized "permissible burdens" which
may be placed on the non-religious in order to accommodate the
115. 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18.
116. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
117. See, e.g., Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (the government has a duty to act neutrally
toward different religious sects). The Establishment Clause, however, not only proscribes
aid to traditional religions as against non-believers, but also precludes aid favoring "those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
118. The Court has often recognized the narrowness of the benefited class as a key
factor in the primary effect analysis. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 (1983);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 831 (1973); Walz, 397 U.S. at 696.
In Walz, Justice Harlan offered the following analysis of statutory "underinclusion":
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The Court
must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate,
as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical question is
whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly
concluded that [all groups that] could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter
[are included].
397 U.S. at 696.
119. 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18.
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interests of the religious. 120 Is there a similar "permissible burden"
which the employer and fellow employees must bear in order to
accommodate the interests of the religious employee? Again, the
the Court is silent.
121
Only one helpful guideline is discernible from the Court's scant
discussion: if a statute places an absolute duty to accommodate on
the employer without providing an exception for the employer
whose business would be unduly burdened by the duty to accom-
modate, then the statute violates the primary effect test of Estab-
lishment Clause analysis. 122 This standard, however, merely chips
away at the tip of a very large iceberg. Many questions remain un-
answered. For example, if reasonable accommodation is permissi-
ble, as opposed to absolute accommodation, then what is reasona-
ble? Likewise, what constitutes an undue burden on the employer
such that he may be excused from the duty to accommodate, or
conversely, what constitutes a permissible burden of which the em-
ployer will not be heard to complain? Furthermore, why should the
other employees who must work in place of the religious employee
not be granted rights under such a statute also?
The court has been applying the primary effect analysis to Es-
tablishment Clause cases for twenty-five years. 2 3 While this per-
haps explains the Court's cursory application of the primary effect
analysis in the principle case, it certainly does not excuse it.
Admittedly, the Lemon test requires that only one of the three
prongs be violated before the statute can be declared unconstitu-
tional, so that the Court cannot be criticized for invalidating the
statute once it determined the primary effect portion of the test
was not met.'2 ' Nevertheless, while judicial restraint and conserva-
tism are generally desirable judicial policies, they do not demand
the sacrifice of thorough analysis of a crucial and novel issue. One
might expect the Court to invalidate a state program providing di-
rect financial aid to a parochial school in a summary decision since
the underlying analysis and rationale has been heard many times
before.' "5 However, in Estate of Thornton, the Court was not deal-
120. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing an Amish student's
exemption from a state compulsory school attendance statute); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971) (exemption from military obligations on religious grounds).
121. Will the Court not recognize "permissible burdens" at all? See Trans World Air-
lines, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
122. 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
123. See Abington, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
124. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Allen, 392
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ing with a settled issue, but instead a disputed one.126 The princi-
pal case afforded the Court an excellent vehicle to scrutinize reli-
gious accommodation statutes under all three prongs of the Lemon
test and thereby settle the constitutional controversy surrounding
such statutes.
In this regard, the Court's decision in Estate of Thornton is a
disappointment, especially in light of the Court's failure to justify
any ability of the state to accommodate religion in the workplace
under the Establishment Clause. For example, even in the area of
"reasonable accommodation" the Court does not explain why it is
permissible for a court to involve itself in religious inquiries neces-
sary to implement the accommodation rule. 127 Whether reasonable
or absolute, religious accommodation necessarily requires inquiry
into the nature and sincerity of individual beliefs in order to deter-
mine whether the individual is entitled to accommodation.128 Per-
haps the Court is willing to allow some government involvement in
religion in this area, as it has in other areas, but it does not say.
Furthermore, assuming that some level of government involvement
is permissible, guidelines for degrees of "permissible entangle-
ment" are surely needed.
Finally, the Court does not discuss the "secular purpose" prong
of the test.129 Perhaps the Court agreed with the Connecticut Su-
preme Court's evaluation of this issue, but, once again, the Court
did not say. 130 The failure to engage in secular purpose analysis
U.S. 236 (1968); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
126. 105 S. Ct. at 2914. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
127. The entanglement principle is not limited to the prohibition of government inter-
ference with religious institutions, but rather it also limits the scope of judicial inquiry into
a claimed religious belief. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 421; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944). Because the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from becoming involved
in purely religious matters, a fortiori the government cannot become embroiled in the busi-
ness of examining religious affirmations. Thus, the entanglement problem arises whenever
an individual claims that his conduct or belief is "religious" under a statute that grants a
privilege or benefit based on religious beliefs. See, e.g., Abington, 473 U.S. 203 (1963); Tor-
caso, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
128. In order for the plaintiff-employee to establish a prima facie case against his
employer under § 53-303e(b), as a threshold matter he must plead and prove that he has a
sincere bona fide religious belief which requires the employer to excuse him from work on
the particular day he claims as his "Sabbath." If the availability of a benefit hinges on the
existence of a religious ground, then an inquiry into the bona fides of such a claim cannot be
avoided. See, e.g., Cummins, 516 F.2d 544, 559 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 429 U.S. 65 (1975),
vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Gavin, 464 F. Supp. at 631. Two essential items must be deter-
mined: one, whether the asserted belief is religious, and two, whether the asserted belief is
sincerely held. Cummins, 516 F.2d at 559 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
129. 105 S. Ct. at 2914. See also supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
130. 105 S. Ct. at 2914.
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leaves unresolved the inevitable dilemma of deciding if and when a
statute must meet the Lemon test under Establishment Clause
scrutiny, or when it may be labelled an anti-discrimination statute
and held to a different standard of review. Thus, serious doubts
are raised about the validity and viability of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which also requires accommodation. 131 The Es-
tate of Thornton majority never addresses the inherent problem of
distinguishing anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII from stat-
utes like section 53-303e(b). The only help comes from a short con-
currence by Justice O'Connor, which strains to declare that Title
VII remains unscathed by the majority's decision, but offers little
more than conclusory statements in support of this contention."3 2
The upshot of the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Thorn-
ton is that the Court "missed the mark." Estate of Thornton
presented the Court with an appropriate vehicle through which to
settle the controversy surrounding religious accommodation stat-
utes in the employment arena, the Court equivocated and the re-
sult was a decision which is both hopelessly ambiguous and super-
ficial, offering very little guidance for the resolution of the complex
problems underlying religious accommodation legislation.
Michael J. Hudock, III
131. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Clearly, this was the fear that Justice
O'Connor was trying to alleviate. 105 S. Ct. at 2918-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. 105 S. Ct. at 2918-19. It seems that Justice O'Connor is willing, unlike the major-
ity, to expressly state that reasonable accommodation as embodied in Title VII would be an
acceptable alternative to the absolute accommodation of the Connecticut statute. She does
not, however, tell us why. For example, she does not explain how reasonable accommodation
is any less offensive to the Establishment Clause than absolute accommodation in light of
the inquiries the Court must make into religious beliefs and sincerity to enforce the accom-
modation statute. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor also fails to
explain why merely including religion as one of several categories receiving protection allows
Title VII to be properly understood as an anti-discrimination statute. If this is all that is
necessary to save the statute from Establishment Clause analysis, then can the states just
sandwich religion in between other categories such as race and national origin and thereby
avoid constitutional scrutiny? In the final analysis, Justice O'Connor's concurrence answers
the easy question of whether the Court will entertain similar challenges to Title VII, how-
ever, it fails, as does the majority opinion, to answer the more difficult underlying questions.
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